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SPEECH  
OF  
MR. SOULE, OF LOUISIANA,

ON  
NON-INTERVENTION,

DELIVERED  
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

MARCH 22, 1852.

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—♦♦♦—  
“There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not entirely lost, by the reputation of weakness.”—*Washington's Message of December 3, 1793.*  
—♦♦♦—



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## RESOLUTIONS.

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Gen. CASS' amendment, designed as a substitute for Mr. CLARKE'S resolutions :

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That while the people of the United States sympathize with all nations who are striving to establish free Governments, yet they recognize the great principle of the law of nations which assures to each of them the right to manage its own internal affairs in its own way, and to establish, alter, or abolish its Government at pleasure, without the interference of any other Power; and they have not seen, nor could they again see, without deep concern, the violation of this principle of national independence.

Mr. CLARKE'S last resolution :

*Resolved,* That although we adhere to these essential principles of non-intervention as forming the true and lasting foundation of our prosperity and happiness, yet whenever a provident foresight shall warn us that our own liberties and institutions are threatened, then a just regard to our own safety will require us to advance to the conflict rather than await the approach of the foes of our constitutional freedom and of human liberty.





## MR. SOULE'S SPEECH.

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MR. CLARKE'S resolutions, and the amendments moved to the same by Mr. SEWARD, of New York, and General CASS, of Michigan, being under consideration—

Mr. SOULE, of Louisiana, rose and said :

I am appalled, Mr. President, by the vast and imposing assemblage which I see congregated in this hall. I fear much, sir, that the announcement, so flatteringly made by some newspapers, of the part which it was presumed I would take in this contest, has raised expectations which it will not be in my power to gratify ; and the anxiety, the distrust, and torment, which such an apprehension is so well calculated to engender, are not a little augmented by the awful magnitude and the difficulties of the subject before me. However, sir, I have no wish to avoid the task. It were too late for me now to disown its claims or to repudiate its exigencies. I will proceed with it, tremblingly, yet with some faint hope that I may still be able to bear its burden in a manner not altogether unbecoming the dignity of an American Senator.

Whatever be the fate that awaits the resolutions upon your table, Mr. President, the debate which has grown out of them will have its influence and bear its fruits. I rejoice that it has afforded us a fit opportunity for proclaiming to the world our abiding faith in the rectitude and ultimate triumph of those great principles on which rest the hopes and the destinies of man-

kind. We are heard at a great distance when we speak from the high places which we occupy here. What of hope and encouragement, what of interest and sympathy we express for down-trodden and oppressed nations is echoed throughout the remotest regions of the world; and while we give utterance to the thought, it runs swiftly on the magic wire, until it moves to congenial and harmonious vibration every fibre of the human heart.

I have no conception that there is so glaring a discrepancy in the sentiments entertained by those Senators who first moved in this debate. What of disagreement I have been able to discern among them, would seem to arise, rather from a misconstruction of the object aimed at by each respectively, than from any real antipathy in their opinions as to what principles we should assert and vindicate here. Though the original resolutions may have been intended (as I have no doubt they were) as a sort of political breakwater, thrown up to compress and still those surges of the popular sentiment to which I took occasion some time ago to allude—though they seem to advocate impassiveness, absolute impassiveness, as the only policy under which we can grow and prosper—yet a discerning eye will not fail to detect that feverish and restless anxiety, the offspring of a keen and unerring foresight, which betrays itself through the dubious, misty, timid, I had almost said bashful admission contained in the last of them, of a possible contingency on the occasion of which “a just regard to our own safety *will require us to advance to the conflict rather than await the approach of the foes of constitutional freedom and of human liberty.*”

The policy so solemnly commended, and so skillfully developed in the remarkable speech by which the Sena-

tor from Rhode Island (Mr. CLARKE) opened this debate, is here held under check by the express reservation and protest that it may come to its last day, and be superseded by another that *will require us to advance*—mark the word!—*to advance to the conflict, and to fight for constitutional freedom and for human liberty.*

But, much to my wonder, and still more to my deep concern, that contingency, so strikingly pointed at in the resolutions, was entirely overlooked in the speech, where it is not even alluded to. Sir, I had determined that it should not remain unheeded, and I now plead its implied concessions in vindication of the views which I propose to lay before the Senate.

I am decidedly against this country being pent up within the narrow circle drawn around it by the advocates of the policy of impassiveness. Escorted though it comes to us by the authority and imposing names of men deservedly honored in our history, that policy has no claims to my sympathies—it is set forth in antagonism to the policy by which the statesmen of the progressive school attempt to initiate, as it is said, a system of interference with the affairs of other nations; the first finds security in inertness; the second, in action. One, under that infatuation which a long series of successes is so apt to produce, points to the past, and credits them all to a system of measures which but prefaced their history; the other invokes the very state of things which those successes have brought about, and, obeying the dictates of new exigencies, strives to turn to profit the solemn warning "*non iisdem artibus, retinentur quibus comparantur.*" I am for the last; and, while vindicating its expediency, I shall attempt to show that the opposed policy cannot claim the support which it so freely borrows from the doctrines and teachings of the

immortal sages under whose protection it shelters itself. Sir, the policy of Washington, as elucidated by his own acts, was by no means that unimpassioned, phlegmatic, cautious, and inactive policy which our opponents would induce us to believe; but, on the contrary, a watchful, sharp, and active policy, ready to interpose wherever and whenever a great interest or a great principle was at stake, and disdaining that submissive wisdom which could abide the most revolting assumptions on the part of foreign powers, from the moment that they did not affect too ostensibly the immediate concerns of the republic.

Through a most strange confusion, the presumed principles implied in the proclamation of neutrality in 1793 are made the ground-work—nay, the very foundation—of those proclaimed in the Farewell Address of the revered patriot and hero; yet who knows not that the neutrality adopted in 1793 was but an essentially transient measure, looking solely to the existing situation of the country, and to the demands which that situation, with its surrounding perils, made upon it?—that it was considered in no other light by General Washington himself is most unequivocally exhibited from the fact that, alluding to this very subject in his Farewell Address, he speaks of it thus: “The period is not far off when we may take such an attitude as will cause *the neutrality* WE MAY AT ANY TIME RESOLVE UPON TO BE RESPECTED,” &c. And this is not the only evidence of the meaning which he intended that the proclamation should convey. It came to be debated in the cabinet council how far, in issuing that proclamation, General Washington had not transcended the powers vested in the President by the Constitution; and we have the authority of Mr. Jefferson to the effect that “*he apologized for the use of the term NEUTRALITY.*” “The President,” re-

marks Mr. Jefferson, "declared he never had an idea that he could bind Congress against declaring war, or that any thing contained in his proclamation could look beyond the day of their meeting." \* \* \* The President said "he had but one object—the keeping our people quite till Congress should meet."

Sir, the circumstances under which the neutrality of 1793 was resolved upon are of sufficient interest, I should imagine, to deserve a passing notice, and to command attention, for a few moments at least, on the part of the Senate.

We were just emerging from that sea of agitation which had been stirred up by the recent remodelling of the National Government, with the treasury exhausted by the incessant demands that were every day made upon it, to satisfy the obligations incurred during a protracted and expensive war. We were unsettled, restless; doubtful whether the new experiment would realize the hopes of those who had advised and attempted it. A war had just broken out between France and England—I should say, between France and coalized Europe;—France alone struggling for her liberties and the liberties of mankind against the world in arms. The question arose what part America should act in that awful conflict. Would she redeem those pledges which ardent and enthusiastic minds had persuaded themselves she was under, and, taking the part of France, strike by her side for the liberties of the world? She could not join England in a crusade against those liberties. Would she, then, participate in the struggle, or would she rather remain a quiet spectator of the gigantic scene, and trust to God the destinies of her ally? Necessity—stern, inflexible necessity—could alone impel her to choose the last alternative.

“This was,” says Lyman in his *American Diplomacy*, “an extraordinary period; France had now become professedly a republic, and was threatened with annihilation by a European coalition, at the head of which was England.” “The distance of America from Europe—the youth and peculiarity of her Government, at that time little understood, and certainly far from being confirmed—the narrowness of her resources—the entire absence of every species of armament—powerfully combined to point out the course she should adopt.” And, now, how curious it is to see what little that proclamation of neutrality did realize for America. It was issued in April, 1793. In the summer following, Great Britain, Russia, Spain, Prussia, and the empire of Germany entered into treaty, for the purpose, among other things, “of closing their ports and prohibiting the exportation of naval stores, corn, grain, and provisions, from their ports to the ports of France.” They also engaged “to take all other measures in their power for injuring the commerce of France,” and to unite all their efforts “to prevent other powers not implicated in the war from giving any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, *in consequence of their neutrality*, to the commerce or property of the French *on the sea* or in the ports of France.” You well know, Mr. President, that in the celebrated treaty of Utrecht, between France and England, even naval stores were declared “free of war;” and you know also that there are treaties on record between England and the United Provinces in 1645, with France in 1667 and 1668, with Spain in 1713, with Denmark in 1782, and with Russia in 1804, in which *provisions* are by name *excluded from the list of contraband*. Shall I say anything of the insults, wrongs, outrages, offered by England to America under the neutrality

policy? Why, sir, they were such as to force upon us within less than a year the necessity of sending a special embassy to the court of St. James, to plead redress for past offences, and, at all events, to obtain security that our rights, under the neutrality, should be in future recognised and respected.

The alarm of the country—its sufferings, its impatience, and irritation—may well be judged from the intimations which our minister was directed to give of them in England. Says our Secretary of State, in his instructions to Mr. Jay, 1794: “You will keep alive in the mind of the British minister that opinion which the solemnity of a special mission must naturally inspire of the *strong agitations* excited in the people of the United States by the *disturbed* condition between them and Great Britain.” \* \* \* \* “You will mention, with *due stress*, the *general irritation* of the United States, at the  *vexations, spoliations, captures,*” &c. &c.

Such was the situation in which the United States found themselves in the year 1794, hardly ten months after the issuing of the famous proclamation. Mr. Jay succeeded in effecting a treaty. What that treaty secured to the United States is what I propose now to investigate. His instructions were explicit. The anxiety of the United States to see those principles acknowledged, which alone could render our neutrality available, was extreme. What did the treaty end in? Turn first to the instructions under which Mr. Jay was directed to act. He was to listen to the suggestions of a commercial treaty, and to keep in view, amongst other objects, the following:

- 1st. Reciprocity in navigation, particularly to the West Indies, and even to the East Indies.
- 2d. Free ships to make free goods.

3d. Proper security for the safety of neutral commerce in other respects, and particularly by declaring provisions never to be contraband, except in the strongest possible case; by defining a blockade; by restricting the opportunities of vexation in visiting vessels.

And what did the treaty allow? Let me tell you: A direct trade between the United States and the West Indies in vessels not exceeding *seventy tons* in burden; but the United States were under an obligation to restrain their vessels from carrying certain articles, the produce of those islands, to any other place than the United States. The Americans were forbidden from "carrying any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton, in American vessels, either from his Majesty's islands or from the United States, to any part of the world except the United States." The treaty restored the ports of the western frontier, but without indemnity for their long detention, or for the slaves carried off by Sir Guy Carleton. Ship timber, tar, hemp, sails, and copper were declared contraband, though free in all other treaties made by the United States. Provisions were declared contraband, and there was an express declaration that the flag did not cover the merchandize—the only treaty ever signed by the United States in which such an acknowledgment is to be found. England, however, at the peace of Utrecht, had acknowledged *that the flag covered the merchandize*. Thus nothing was secured. None of the rights which Mr. Jay had been directed to assert and vindicate were recognized, and the treaty signed by him justified the judgment passed upon its merits, through the appellation by which it went, of *an instrument that settled nothing*. Nor were those rights respected by England after the treaty. Her aggressions went on, increasing until they forced us into the



very extremities which the neutrality was intended to provide against; and we realized the pungent witticism by which one of our early statesmen defines a neutral power—"a power that both belligerents plunder with impunity."

Lyman, from whom I have already quoted, writes thus of the motives which induced the United States so long to forbear under repeated inflictions of outrage and wrong:

"America, a new State, was thrust hastily, with all the attributes of sovereignty, into the midst of the old nations of Europe. Not having grown up with them, trying her wings, feeling her strength as she advanced to mature age along with those powers, her relative position was not ascertained, and acts of the parties engaged in the European wars were patiently endured, not from want of sagacity and spirit, both to perceive and resist the injustice and wrong, but from a well-founded doubt and distrust of the real strength of the people."

And, qualifying, afterwards, the system of self-denial which was then adopted, he adds that it was "both originally mistaken, and pursued to a pernicious extent."

I desire now to direct the attention of the Senate to the sentiments entertained by Washington of the obligations which this country had assumed under the proclamation of neutrality. He clearly did not consider that it had so fettered this Government as to wrest from it all discretion to determine how far it could interfere and take concern in the affairs of the world. He was not the man who could have surrendered the right of asserting boldly and fearlessly those principles which were at the very bottom of our independence, and stood up to our dignity, whenever and wherever they might be assailed or put in danger.

Sir, at the very moment that he was instructing Mr. Jay to listen to propositions of a treaty on the part of

England—at the very time he was asserting, through that minister, the rights of neutrals—he was urging also the expediency of sounding ministers then at the Court of London, as to the probability of an alliance with their respective nations, to support certain principles involving great international interests.

I find amongst the instructions given to Mr. Jay, the following:

“You will have no difficulty in gaining access to the ministers of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, at the Court of London. The principles of the armed neutrality would abundantly cover our neutral rights. If, therefore, the situation of things, with respect to Great Britain, should dictate the necessity of taking the precaution of foreign co-operation upon this head, if no prospect of accommodation should be thwarted by the danger of such a measure being known to the British Court, and an entire view of all our political relations shall, in your judgment, permit the step, *you will sound those ministers upon the probability of an alliance with their nations to support those principles.*”

One of Mr. Jay's objects was, therefore, to obtain the recognition of *certain principles*; but, if he should not succeed in this, what was he to do? Await until they were assailed and put in peril at our own doors? By no means; but proclaim them to the world under the sanction of powers allied with us to enforce them, that it might be understood on what grounds America would act, and would insist to be dealt with.

There is another fact in the diplomatic history of that epoch which most strikingly illustrates what opinions were entertained by the immediate advisers of Washington with respect to the course which it might be expedient for this country to pursue, under circumstances arising out of that neutrality which, it is said, constituted then the policy of this Government.

But before I proceed to enter this branch of the subject, let me place before you, Mr. President, a fact that will speak out louder than any words of mine, how far Washington himself considered that his proclamation of neutrality constrained the American Government from interposing where the eternal right of nations to provide for themselves a suitable Government was interfered with by powers foreign to them. On the 10th of June, 1794, he directs his Secretary of State to instruct Mr. Monroe—then our minister to France—to the following effect :

“ You will assure the French Government that the President has been an early and decided friend of the French revolution ; and whatever reason there may have been, under our ignorance of facts and policy, to suspend an opinion upon some of its important transactions, yet *is he immutable* in his wishes for its accomplishment—*incapable of assenting to the right of any foreign Prince to meddle with its interior arrangements.*”

Nor were these proceedings on the part of the American Government in contradiction with the recommendations contained in the Farewell Address, as I shall hereafter most conclusively show.

Let me now remark that the address bears date September 17, 1793. We are—I mean in thought—in 1797, at a most critical epoch of our history, when painful difficulties were on the eve of breaking out between us and France. Washington had been recalled to the command of the army. Alexander Hamilton was to be his second in that command. Such was the confidence which Washington reposed in Gen. Hamilton that he made his appointment to this high rank the condition of his own acceptance of the trust tendered him by President Adams.

The Spanish colonies were in great ferment. The example of the British colonies had roused their spirit,

and moved them into an active search of assistance to shake off the authority of the mother country. They had sent to Europe emissaries, who were now holding council in Paris. From that place these emissaries were sending confidential agents in all directions to promote the great object of their mission—the emancipation of the Hispano-American colonies. They had just agreed to a *projet* which they had sent to England, to be submitted to the gigantic, though youthful, minister who then lorded it over the destinies of that country.

Here is an extract from that *projet*:

“ARTICLE 4. A defensive alliance formed between Great Britain, the United States, and South America, is so recommended by the nature of things—by the geographical situation of the three countries—by the productions, wants, character, habits, and manners of the three nations—that it is not possible that it should not long continue, especially if care is used to consolidate it by an analogy in the political form of the three Governments—that is to say, by the enjoyment of civil liberty wisely conceived,” &c. &c.

General Miranda—who, up to this moment, had been opposed to any such movement on the part of the Spanish colonies—was persuaded to join in this scheme; and he immediately wrote to Mr. Hamilton, asking his co-operation and support. “It appears,” says he in one of his letters, “that the moment of our emancipation is arriving, and that the establishment of liberty on the whole American continent is confided to our care by Providence.” Here was, you will admit, Mr. President, a fair opportunity for testing the principles of neutrality laid down in the proclamation, and the doctrine of non-interference asserted in the Farewell Address, as constituting the settled and permanent policy of the country. Here is the answer of Hamilton to General Miranda:

NEW YORK, *August 22, 1798.*

\* \* \* \* \*

“The sentiments I entertain in regard to that object have been long since in your knowledge; but I could personally have no participation in it, unless patronized by the Government of this country. It was my wish that matters had been referred for a co-operation in the course of this fall on the part of this country; but that can now be scarcely the case. The winter, however, may mature the project, and an actual co-operation by the United States may take place. In this case I shall be happy in my official station to be an instrument of so good a work.

“The plan, in my opinion, ought to be, after that of Great Britain, an army of the United States—a government for the liberated Territories agreeable to both co-operators, but about which there will probably be no difficulty. To arrange the plan a competent authority to some person here from Great Britain is the best expedient. Your presence here will in this case be extremely essential. We are raising an army of 12,000 men. General Washington has resumed his station at the head of the army. I am appointed second in command.

“With esteem and regard, &c.,      A. HAMILTON.”

Nor was this correspondence so mysterious as not to admit of its secret being transferred to the cabinet council of Mr. Adams, and to the foreign minister then representing this country at the court of England.

Mr. Hamilton encloses his answer to Miranda in a letter to Rufus King, in which he alludes to the disclosure which he had made in high quarters of the whole scheme. He writes thus, on the 22d of August, 1798:

“I have received several letters from Miranda. I have written an answer to some of them, which I send you to deliver or not, according to your estimate of what is passing in the scene where you are. Should you deem it expedient to suppress my letter, you may do it, and say as much as you think fit on my part, in the nature of a communication through you.

“With regard to the enterprise in question, I wish it much to be undertaken: but I should be glad that the principal agency was in the United States—they to furnish the whole land force, if necessary. The command, in this case, would very naturally fall upon me: and I hope I should disappoint no favorable anticipations. \* \* \* \* \*

“Are we yet ready for this undertaking? Not quite; but we ripen fast, and it may, I think, be rapidly brought to maturity, if an efficient negotiation is at once set on foot upon this ground. Great Britain cannot alone insure the accomplishment of the object. I have some time since advised certain preliminary steps to prepare the way consistently with national character and justice. I was told they would be pursued; but I am not able to say whether they have been or not.”

In a subsequent letter of General Miranda to Hamilton, I find what follows:

“Your wishes are, in some degree, fulfilled, since it is here agreed (he writes from London) that the English troops shall not be employed in the land operations. The naval force shall be English, while the troops employed will be American. Every arrangement is made, and we are only waiting for the declaration of your President to depart.”

I need go no further to show that the policy which Washington meant to recommend and to act upon, was, that while we should not entangle ourselves *in permanent alliances*, or implicate our interests in the *ordinary vicissitudes* and the *ordinary combinations* of the politics of Europe, while we might trust to *temporary alliances* for extraordinary emergencies, we should not, therefore, disown ourselves, and cower beneath the fear of giving umbrage by a dignified assertion of our rights under the laws of nations.

We have found him as early as 1794, not a year after the proclamation of neutrality, directing Mr. Monroe to give assurances that he was *incapable of assenting to the right of any foreign prince to meddle with the affairs of*

*other nations.* About the same time he instructs Mr. Jay to sound the ministers of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, as to the probability of an alliance with their nations to support certain principles, and, behold! he urges the mustering of our forces at the very moment when Hamilton joins a combination through which an American army of 12,000 men is to enter Mexico, under his lead, to effect the independence of that country. Is not this policy of action a disclaimer of that other policy advocated upon this floor by the mover of the original resolutions, and by those who side with him? But we have still another example tending to subvert the entire structure built up by the advocates of the policy of impassiveness. I have shown what construction, in practice, Washington had placed upon the principles laid down in the proclamation and in the Farewell Address. His policy ended not with him. It went on, infusing itself through those who came after him. President Monroe, who had enjoyed his full confidence, who must be presumed to have imbibed his opinions and views, did not hesitate to take a bold and decisive stand, when came the crisis which threatened a coalition of certain European powers to reduce the Spanish colonies to submission, and to organize them again into monarchies. You well remember, Mr. President, that famous passage in the address which he sent to Congress in December, 1823; though the solemn declaration has fixed itself indelibly in the memories and hearts of our people, the circumstances that it brought about are comparatively but little known, and may not seem unworthy of a brief notice. Mr. Rush, a statesman of the most pure patriotism, as well as of the highest order of intellect and talent, whose lofty character has so deeply impressed itself in the diplomatic history of that

period, who exhibited in his person the rare combination of the most profound wisdom, and the most extensive knowledge, with the bland and fascinating manners, the accomplishments and polish of the gentleman, who never said a word that was improper, nor betrayed a thought that might peril his country's fortunes—Mr. Rush was minister at the court of St. James. Among the important negotiations intrusted to his management was that of obtaining from England a recognition of independence for the Spanish colonies. He approached the subject with inexpressible skill and adroitness, and soon brought the British minister to his views, by suggesting a joint declaration of the principles upon which that independence should be vindicated. The conferences which took place between him and Mr. Canning are full of a most lively interest, and pay richly the reader for the time he bestows upon their perusal. I am sure I will not seem ungracious to the Senate if I attempt to put them in possession of some remarkable passages which I have extracted from the book in which they are registered.

Alluding to (1823) a note from Mr. Canning to the British ambassador at Paris relative to a presumed design on the part of France to bring some of the Spanish possessions in America under her dominion, either by conquest or by cession from Spain, Mr. Rush had expressed the sentiment that it implied clearly that "England would not remain passive under any such attempt by France." Mr. Canning then asked Mr. Rush, "*What he thought the American government would say to going hand in hand with England in such a policy.*"—("Residence at the Court of London," p. 400.)

In the course of the same conversation Mr. Canning added that—



“The knowledge that the United States would be opposed to it as well as England could not fail to have its decisive influence in checking it.”—(Ibid, p. 403.)

And in a note bearing date the 20th of August, 1823, he asks again :

“If the moment has not arrived when the two governments (England and the United States) might understand each other as to the Spanish American colonies; and if so, whether it would not be expedient for them, and for all the world, that their principles in regard to those colonies should be clearly settled and avowed; that as to England she had no disguise on the subject.”—(Ibid, p. 412.)

In reply to Mr. Canning’s communication, Mr. Rush declared—

“That the United States would view as unjust and improper any attempt on the part of the powers of Europe to intrench upon the independence of the Spanish possessions in America.”

And in a note of August 27, he asserts

“That his Government would regard the convening of a European Congress to deliberate upon the affairs of the Spanish colonies as a measure uncalled for, and indicative of a policy *highly unfriendly to the tranquility of the world*; that it could not look with insensibility upon such an exercise of European jurisdiction over communities now exempt from it, and entitled to regulate their own concerns unmolested from abroad.”—(p. 419.) “That, could England see fit to consider the time as now arrived for fully acknowledging the independence of the new communities, he (Mr. Rush) believed that not only would it accelerate the steps of this Government, but *that it would naturally place him in a new position in his further course on the whole subject.*”

“Should I be asked,” writes Mr. Rush in his letter to the American Secretary of State, dated London, August 28, 1823—“Should I be asked by Mr. Canning whether, in case the recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay, *I am on my part prepared to make a declaration, in the name of my Government, that it will not remain inactive under an attack*

*upon the independence of those States by the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is, that I WILL MAKE SUCH A DECLARATION EXPLICITLY, AND AVOW IT BEFORE THE WORLD.—*  
(P. 421.)

Nor was Mr. Rush insensible of the importance of the step he was prepared to take. In his communication to the American Secretary of State of April 30th, of same year, he says:

“I am fully sensible of the magnitude of the subjects to be treated of, *the complicated character of the considerations involved in most of them, and of their momentous bearings, in present and future ages, upon the interests, the welfare, and the honor of the United States.*” These words borrowed from the Secretary’s own letter to which he was answering.—(P. 423.)

On the 15th of September Mr. Rush writes to the President:

“That it is still his intention to urge upon Mr. Canning the immediate recognition of the new States by Great Britain as the only footing upon which he could feel warranted in acceding to the proposal made to him.—(P. 427.)

Speaking of the declaration asked of him by Mr. Canning, he remarks:

“The value of my declaration would depend upon its being formally made known to Europe. Would not such a step wear the appearance of the United States implicating themselves in the political connexions of Europe? Would it not be acceding, in this instance at least, to the policy of one of the great European powers, in opposition to the projects avowed by others of the first rank? This hitherto had been no part of the system of the United States. The very reverse of it had been acted upon. Their foreign policy had been essentially bottomed on the great maxim of preserving peace and harmony with all nations, without offending any, or forming entangling alliances with any. Upon the institutions as upon the dissensions of the European powers, the Government and people of the United States might form and even express

their speculative opinions; but it had been no part of their past conduct to interfere with the one, or, being unmolested themselves, to become parties to the others. In this broad principle laid one of my difficulties under his proposal."

To this Mr. Canning would reply:

"That, however just such a policy might have been formerly, or might continue to be as a general policy, he apprehended that powerful and controlling circumstances might make it inapplicable in particular occasions," &c.

And upon the rejoinder Mr. Rush again says:

"For myself, speaking only as an individual, I could well conceive that the interposition of an authoritative voice by the United States, in favor of these communities, admitting that the powers of Europe usurped a claim to control their destinies, would imply no real departure from the principles which had hitherto regulated their foreign intercourse, or pledge them henceforth to the political connexions of the Old World. If, too, that voice happened to be in unison with the voice of Great Britain, it might prove but the more auspicious to the common object which both nations had in view, without committing either to any systematic or ulterior concert. But I added, that as the question of the United States expressing this voice, and promulgating it under official authority to the powers of Europe, was one of entire novelty as well of great magnitude in their history, it was for my Government, and not for me, to decide upon its propriety." \* \* \*

"Let Great Britain immediately and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new States. \* \* \* I will not scruple, on seeing that important event come about, to lend my official name to the course proposed, and count upon my Government stamping with its subsequent approval what I have done."—(Pp. 436, 437.)

Mr. Rush then goes on to tell us that—

"By the early transmission of the proposals made to him by Mr. Canning, in his notes of the latter end of August, the copies of them, as well as of his reports of the conferences on the whole subject, arrived at Washington in time to en-

gage the deliberations of President Monroe and his cabinet, before the meeting of Congress in December, and it was very satisfactory to him to learn that the part he had acted was approved."—(Pp. 456, 457.)

The policy of impassiveness, therefore, has no warrant in the past, and the warnings of Washington and of his compeers, so far, do not reach the ground covered by this debate. Let me define distinctly the position which I mean to occupy. I am not for entangling ourselves by permanent alliances in the ordinary vicissitudes of foreign politics, or in the ordinary combinations and collisions of foreign friendship or enmities. I am for trusting to temporary alliances in extraordinary emergencies; but I cannot be for surrendering the high rank which we are entitled to occupy at the council-board of nations. I can neither abdicate the rights which that position implies, nor disavow the obligations which it imposes; and, inasmuch as the amendment proposed by the distinguished Senator from Michigan (Mr. CASS) carries me not beyond the ground embraced in the avowals just stated, to that amendment shall I give my unqualified support and vote. It embodies my views in the guarded yet significant form of its language; it speaks out in dignified tones sentiments which respond to the throbs of every American heart, and shows that while penning its resolves the distinguished Senator had not out of mind the remark made by Washington in his message of December 3, 1793, "*that there was a rank due to the United States among nations which would be withheld, if not entirely lost, by the reputation of weakness.*"

But suppose I were in error with respect to the bearing of the Washingtonian policy, as exemplified by his own doings, the question would still remain, whether it was

ever intended it should remain an immutable rule, to be pursued by this Government under what changes soever might occur in the history of its progress.

Speaking of our commercial intercourse with foreign nations, Washington himself, in his Farewell Address, recommends the "establishment of certain conventional rules, *the best that present circumstances and mutual opinions will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate.*"

Our policy, upon the same principle, must also change. It is not in the power of man to impart immutability to any of its works. Our policy must change; it will change. Who is the statesman, where is the statesman, who will consider himself so constrained by the traditions of the past as to admit that it should bind the present in shackles, and keep the future in thralldom? Sir, we cannot thus be enslaved to the opinions and judgments of those who have preceded us. Are we the nation we were in 1793? Does Europe stand to us in the relation it then stood? Consider: We were but three millions of people then; we are now twenty-three millions. The area of our territory exceeded hardly eight hundred thousand square miles; it now measures upwards of three millions. Our commercial relations with the whole world embraced an aggregate of one hundred and fifteen millions of dollars; they reach now to upwards of three hundred and eighteen millions; on a comparative survey of the commercial progress of this country and of England we find that, while the mercantile movement of the United States in half a century has increased in the ratio of three hundred per cent., that of England has only attained two hundred per cent. Taking for granted that the

two countries will progress in the same ratio during the coming century, we find that in 1890 the commerce of the United States will be eight hundred and seventy millions, that of England twelve hundred millions; and in 1940 the commerce of the United States will be twenty-three hundred and seventy-seven millions, while that of England will only be twenty-two hundred and eighty-nine millions—thus leaving the United States with a surplus over England of eighty-eight millions.

We have now a seacoast extending 5,620 miles in length; it extended in 1793 but 1,700 miles. We had scarcely a commercial marine; now our steam force alone amounts to upwards of fourteen hundred steamers, measuring 417,283 tons; while the whole steam marine of all Europe in 1848 did not exceed twelve hundred and twenty-four steamers, of 164,713 tons burden.

To insist, sir, that while our numbers, the extent of our territory, our commerce, and our shipping, have so much changed, our interests, our wants, our rights, our obligations under those rights, should remain what they were sixty-five years ago, is to scorn the teaching of our judgment, and to belie the wisdom of God.

But it is said that we should have no concern with interests connected with European policy, and that we should confine ourselves to extending our commercial relations with foreign countries without ever entangling ourselves in their politics—aye, sir, if we can so separate those relations as to keep them in absolute freedom of each other; but this is not in our power to effect. Commercial intercourse will, and must of necessity, beget political entanglements. The question is not how you may avoid them—they will defy your prudence, and put in default all your diplomacy—but the question is, how will you meet them with the least possible danger to

your peace and your prosperity; you could not, if you would, disconnect yourselves at this day from Spain, England, or Russia. There they stand nailed to your sides. Suppose for a moment that Spain chooses to transfer Cuba to a foreign government, would we stand still? Suppose England were to exercise somewhat more ostensibly than she does at present her dictatorship over the Central American republics, would you stand still? Suppose Russia should re-issue her ukase of 1821, and so extend the circle of prohibition, which she had the boldness to draw around herself, as to exclude you entirely from the northern waters of the Pacific, would you stand still? No, sir; you would not—you could not. Again, sir: suppose England were induced to join a European coalition, and become a party to another *continental system*, can you realize what advantages Europe could tender her that would not be ruinous to your interests? Might not, perchance, a new Pozzo de Borgo instil into the brains of some raving autocrat the thought, by him suggested in 1817, of subjugating these States, in order to protect the world against the poisonous effects of their institutions?\*

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\*A SINGULAR HISTORICAL FACT.—The New York Express, brings to light a singular historical fact which is not generally known. It says that, in 1817, a Russian of eminence, M. Pozzo de Borgo, being then in Paris, proposed in a memoir, addressed to his court on the importance of replacing South America under the dominion of Spain, that the United States should be subjugated. He said that, “founded on the sovereignty of the people, the Republic of the United States of America was a fire, of which the daily contact with Europe threatened the latter with conflagration; that as an asylum for all innovators it gave them the means of disseminating at a distance, by their writings, and by the authority of their ex-

I repeat it again, you have no power either to surrender your rights or to disown your obligations. Assert your rights and fulfil your obligations. Let the world know that while you are prepared to comply with the latter, you cannot suffer the former to be questioned or invaded. But some will say: this is war! Not quite. And if it were, I could not see that we ought on that account abstain from asserting what is good and just in itself. Know you not, sir, that moral power, in time of war as well as in time of peace, acts the first part, and often coerces the power of numbers to unconditional surrender? Let me read you from Heffter a few lines, which define more accurately, than any thing I have yet read, the origin, the sanction, and the imposing commands of the law of nations:

“The law of nations has neither lawgiver nor supreme judge, since independent States acknowledge no superior human authority. Its organ and regulator is public opinion. Its supreme tribunal is history, which forms at once the rampart of justice and the Nemesis by which injustice is avenged. Its sanction, or the obligation of all men to respect it, results from the moral order of the universe, which will not suffer nations and individuals to be isolated from each other, but constantly tends to unite the whole family of mankind in one great harmonious society.”

ample, a poison of which the communication could not be questioned, as it was well known that the French revolution had its origin in the United States; that already troublesome effects were felt from the presence of the French refugees in the United States.” The Russian ambassador went on to state and argue that the conquest of the United States was an easy enterprise; that the degree of power to which the Americans had risen made them objects of fear to the European monarchical governments, &c. The editor of the Express came in contact with this curious paper in the State Library at Albany, in an old file of the Missouri Republican, printed more than thirty years ago.



What! speak you of isolation? Have you not markets to retain for your present excess of production, and markets to secure for the surplus of your future wealth? Can you rely on the sympathies of Princes, Kings, or Czars, for a continuance of those relations which alone can enable you to retain the advantages which you enjoy on the old continent? Disown not yourself. Be not unmindful that you are a member of the great family of nations. Do not repudiate the relations which that membership implies. The law that binds nations to each other is your law as well as theirs. Let it not be violated with impunity. That law rests on the dictates of public opinion. Will you give up your share in forming it? In vain seek you to remain isolated. The tendencies of your political organization, your commercial as well as your social interests, that thirst after the unknown, which you can neither compress nor satisfy, will throw you forcibly into contact with foreign powers. What their policy may induce them to attempt against your commerce, will not cease to be a political aggression, though it should affect only your mercantile interest. With the progressive ratio of your production compared with your population, you may have in 1,900 an excess of seven hundred millions in your produce. Where will you find a market for it? In the East!—in the East! There you must look to for custom—thither 750,000,000 of consumers invite your commodities and your excess of wealth. The dependence of England on your great staple for the supply of her extensive manufactories, may counsel her to take you into partnership in the enjoyment of the gorgeous boon. But should Russia gain the ascendancy there, what would your prospects be? Her policy is essentially exclusive, antagonistic

to your interest. Suppose she lays hands on Turkey, and shuts you out of the Mediterranean: might not this great basin become again the great reservoir and entrepot of Eastern commerce? You see then, sir, that interest alone presses you on all sides not to remain isolated. In self-defence you are bound to watch every movement of European policy. See how strangely have fallen those Balkans which wise and far-seeing statesmen had raised in the combined strength of Hungary and Austria against the devouring ambition of the Cossack! Austria, now a Russian province, is but a relay to the Czar on his route to Turkey. He can now approach Constantinople by Vienna as surely as by Bucharest.

It may be too late for us to interpose a protest against an accomplished wrong; it is never too late to provide against its recurrence. Do not late events speak loud of the future? See you not England herself succumbing to the continental coalition? How anxious she seems not to give offence to European despots! Mark her condescensions to their biddings. On the very day that Lord Palmerston was surrendering his seals, Vienna was revelling in joy and exultation at the triumph which the anticipated fall of that minister prepared to Austria. Lord Malmesbury bends in humble compliance to the remonstrances of France and Austria, and narrows the circle of the liberties conceded to European exiles; and Lord Derby inaugurates his advent to power by withdrawing the bill which extended the electoral franchises of the British subjects; and thus is England belying her past, as if she no longer recollected those proud days of her glory when her minister could exclaim in the House of Commons, "We go to plant the standard of England on the well-known

heights of Lisbon ; where that standard is planted foreign dominion shall not come ;” or, when hurling defiance at France, then in possession of Spain, the same minister triumphantly avowed his resolution, “that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies ; that he had called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.” But, sir, while she shows herself so submissive to European despotism, see how menacingly she rides our waters, and how arrogantly she deals out her protectorate to Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the kingdom of Mosquito. Even this wavering and irresolute administration of ours could not but speak out high words of complaint—nay, sir, the very words of the amendment introduced by the Senator from Michigan, to remonstrate against the untoward assumption. But, the complaint was soon stilled by empty excuses in one case, and in the other by the reassertion of the very right and power denied and protested against. The Senate will recollect what occurred upon the appearance of the French and British squadrons in the Gulf of Mexico. A conference took place on that occasion between the acting Secretary of State and Mr. Crampton, then British charge d’affaires to this Government, and a correspondence was had between the same acting Secretary and the French minister, in both of which our Government asserted *its deep concern* at the unlooked-for interference, and insisted upon obtaining satisfactory explanations. The French minister, with a frankness and in a tone which do great credit to his character, and yet with that dignified reserve that behooved the representative of a great nation, met the question in perfect fairness, and declared, “first, that the instructions issued by the Government of the republic were spontaneous and iso-

lated; secondly, that those instructions were exclusive, for an exclusive case, and applicable only to the class, and not to the nationality, of any pirate or adventurer that should attempt to land in arms on the shores of a friendly nation."

The answer was conclusive, and this government deemed it satisfactory. But how was it with the British charge d'affaires? The memorandum of the conference informs us that "Mr. Crampton, at an interview with Mr. Crittenden at the Department of State, on the 27th of September, 1851, stated that he had been directed by her Majesty's government to say to the United States Secretary of State that her Majesty's government had learned, WITH DEEP REGRET, that expeditions have again been prepared in the ports of the United States for an attack upon a territory belonging to a sovereign at peace with the United States and in friendly relations with her Majesty." \* \* \* \*

"That her Majesty's Government deem it due to the frankness which ought to characterize the intercourse between the two Governments to state to that of the United States, THAT HER MAJESTY'S SHIPS-OF-WAR ON THE WEST INDIA STATION WILL HAVE ORDERS TO PREVENT BY FORCE ANY ADVENTURERS, OF ANY NATION, FROM LANDING WITH HOSTILE INTENT UPON THE ISLAND OF CUBA." I had thought, sir, that, under the prevalence of this doctrine of non-intervention, the illustrious statesman who is at the head of the State Department, with that tone of voice that bespeaks the depths of his thoughts, though not always the invincible energy of his will, might have gravely told the British Charge: "Sir, this is no concern of yours. Withdraw your ships. We can minister for ourselves the police of our affairs over our own waters." But I am mistaken, I think; it

was not Mr. Webster, but Mr. Crittenden, who then occupied the chair of State. And very strenuously does he retort, "*That the President could not, WITHOUT CONCERN, witness any attempt to accomplish the object*" in contemplation of the British Government "by means which might eventually lead to encroachments on the rights of the people of the United States;" that "the execution of the orders received by her Majesty's squadron would be the exercise of a sort of police over the seas in our immediate vicinity, covered as they are with our ships and our citizens; and it would involve, moreover, to some extent, the exercise of a jurisdiction to determine what expeditions were of the character denounced, as well as who were the guilty adventurers engaged in them;" and he closed by expressing "the hope that there may never arise any occasion for carrying any such orders into execution." What answer, Mr. President, do you suppose Mr. Crampton made to the State Department? Here is the communication he addresses to Mr. Webster on the 12th of November. It encloses a letter to himself from Lord Palmerston, reasserting, as I have already said, the very right and assumption of power complained of and protested against.

BRITISH LEGATION, WASHINGTON, November 12, 1851.

SIR: With reference to our conversation on the 10th inst., and in compliance with your desire, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the despatch addressed to me by Lord Palmerston, which I then read to you, upon the subject of the orders issued to her Majesty's ships-of-war on the West Indian station, respecting unauthorized expeditions against the Island of Cuba.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my highest consideration,

Hon. D. WEBSTER, &c., &c. JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

[No. 16.]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 22, 1851.*

SIR: I have received your despatch No. 29, of the 6th instant, and I have to acquaint you that *her Majesty's Government approves the course pursued by you in communicating to the Government of the United States the orders issued by her Majesty's Government to the Commander-in-chief of her Majesty's ships in the West Indies, respecting the prevention of lawless expeditions against Cuba.*

If you should have any further conversation with the Secretary of State of the United States on this subject, you may assure him that every care will be taken that, *in executing these preventive measures against the expeditions of persons whom the United States Government itself has denounced as not being entitled to the protection of any government, no interference shall take place with the lawful commerce of any nation.*

I am, &amp;c.,

PALMERSTON.

JOHN F. CRAMPTON, Esq., &amp;c., &amp;c., &amp;c.

Here is, then, on the part of England, the assumption of the right not only to exercise her police over our waters and over vessels sailing under American colors, but to decide for herself of the nature and character of an expedition departing from our shores; for, the squadron "*has orders to prevent by force, any adventurers of ANY NATION from landing, WITH HOSTILE INTENT,*" upon the island of Cuba! Has reparation been yet demanded of the insult thus offered to the majesty of the American flag? Has the minister of England apologized for the unceremonious evasion with which the charge d'affaires escaped the necessity of a committing answer? The accomplished and skilful gentleman who now represents Great Britain near this Republic would be loth to admit that his Government had transcended its privileges, or might, under any circumstances, surrender the exercise of its assumed rights. Here was, you will admit, Mr. President, a fit opportunity for this

Administration to display some of that watchful energy which it so mercilessly exhibited on a kindred occasion. Why is it that it suffered its wrath to be so easily soothed and its susceptibilities to slumber? What business had it to be thus tolerant and accommodating when it had pursued, with such an unrelenting severity and rancor that little band of deluded, but brave and chivalrous men who had engaged in that unfortunate and ill-advised expedition which ended so miserably at Baya Honda? Was it love for non-intervention that prompted the policy which branded the invasion with deadly names, and doomed the invaders to an ignominious slaughter? Sir, I disapproved then, as I disapprove now, the reckless undertaking; but those who engaged in it had stout and noble hearts; they were enthusiasts—maniacs, if you choose—but enthusiasts maddened by the most disinterested and the most lofty aspirations. What right had this Administration to track them through the waters of the Gulf, beyond the line of our municipal jurisdiction? Will its friends show me where, in the constitution, is lodged the power which the President thought proper to exert on that occasion? And, as if the butchery made of fifty of our citizens, slaughtered in full daylight, within view of our flag waving sadly over our ships-of-war, and in wanton violation of the most solemn and the most explicit treaty stipulations, was not enough to satisfy the most extravagant exactions of Castilian pride, Castilian punctilio, and Castilian revenge, we are driven to witness, in the great metropolis of the South, the heart-rending spectacle of a salute booming out to exulting Spain, repentance and atonement in the name of the United States of America! The triumph won by the Spanish minister on this occasion over the susceptibilities, once

so keen, of our statesmen, has no precedent in the annals of the diplomatic history of any nation.

But to return to the present aspect of affairs in Europe, and to the new attitude in which England stands to the continental powers;—Believe you, sir, that she would now be so humble, so dejected, so submissive to Austro-Russian dictation, if she had firmly stood up by those principles which her Chathams and her Cannings had so proudly proclaimed to the world? How dearly she pays for her impassiveness, while the Roman Republic was fattening under French bayonets, while Hungary was slaughtered by Russian sabres, and while Cracow laid prostrate at the feet of her plunderers.

Sir, let us not be lulled into slumber by the idea that we are too distant from Europe to be affected by her political convulsions. Know you not that violence and oppression are contagious, and that their triumph, in any point of time, or on any point of the globe, reacts on the moral world?

What, Mr. President, speak of isolation, when you can ride your floating palaces from continent to continent in less time than it took your fathers, fifty years ago, to travel from Buffalo to New York—from Boston to Philadelphia!—when every wave of the ocean brings you swift messengers, blown over to these western shores by the same breeze that wafted them away from the eastern hemisphere?—when, low as it beats, you can hear every pulsation of the European heart beneath the iron hands that strive to compress and stifle its languid and agonizing energies?

But it is insisted that an expression of our sympathies is more a matter of sentiment than of right and policy. Ah, sir, I pity the statesman who does not know that public sentiment, which sometimes supplies



and sometimes corrects the law, is always its strongest support.

Sir, believe me, it is our interest, and if not our interest, our duty, to keep alive, by good offices among the nations of Europe, that reverence for the institutions of our country, that devout faith in their efficacy, which looks to their promulgation throughout the world as to the great millennium which is to close the long calendar of their wrongs. Let their flame light up the gloom and dispel the darkness that now envelop them. Humbled though they be, despise them not. It was not their choice, but treachery that made them slaves: and if you should ask why is it they seem to look with approving smiles and contented hearts to the hands that brandish the rod over them, forget not those deluded wretches destined to the beasts, for the entertainment of the Roman Emperors, who could not be persuaded that Cæsar was not Rome; and who, upon entering the Coliseum, as they passed his seat, would bow to him, in respectful submission, and exclaim: "*Cæsar, morituri te salutant*"—Cæsar, though doomed to die, we salute you.

I heard, the other day, the honorable Senator from Tennessee, in one of those soul-stirring feats of eloquence so peculiarly his own, disclaim that there be anything like destiny in the callings of a nation. How could he have thus overlooked that there is not a work of God's wisdom, nor a striving of the human intellect, that bears not the indelible seal of destiny? Onward! onward! is the injunction of God's will, as much as *Ahead! ahead!* is the aspiration of every American heart. We boast exultingly of our wisdom. Do we mean to hide it under the bushel, from fear that its light would set the world in flames? As well might

Christianity have been confined to the walls of a church or to the enclosures of a cloister. What had it effected for mankind, what had it effected for itself, without the spirit that promulged it to the world? Onward! onward!! To stand still is to lie lifeless—inertia is death. Had Mahomet stood still, would he and the mountain have got together? Had the colonies stood still, would this be the Government it is? Had Jefferson and Polk stood still, would Louisiana be ours? Would Texas, would California, sit here in the bright garments of their sovereignty?

You commend the policy of the fathers of the republic as if time, that withers the strength of man, did not “throw around him the ruins of his proudest monuments.” Have I not shown how mutable it had been? Let us not calumniate the past by fastening its usurpations upon the future. I revere its teachings, but cannot submit to make them the measure of present wisdom. Speaking of the sages whose names and authority have so often been invoked in this debate, the elder Adams attempts to exculpate the narrowness of their views and policy by this remark: “The present actors on the stage have been too little prepared by their early views, and too much occupied with turbulent scenes, to do more than they have done.” And with what ardent fervor and hope, with what enthusiasm, he speaks of the scenes which display themselves to his view in the future of his country! “A prospect into futurity in America is like contemplating the heavens through the telescope of Herschel. Objects stupendous in their magnitude and motions strike us from all quarters and fill us with amazement!”

My reverence for opinions consecrated by the authority of the sages who preceded us will not induce me to

disintegrate this republic, and shear from its domain Louisiana, Texas, Florida, the Californias, and New Mexico, because, forsooth, Washington, Adams, and Hamilton may have held that any accession of new territory to the area embraced by the old States was unconstitutional. I could not give a vote for the re-chartering of a national bank because its institution had the assent of the same great men. Nor could I shut my ears, on their account, to those whisperings of the future that betoken the rising of new generations impatient to throw themselves on our lap. Sir, I have a mind to place before you the record of strange prophecies made on the future growth, strength, prosperity, and empire of these States, at a time when they were but dependent and subordinate colonies of a distant nation. They are to be found spread over in the memorials of Mr. Pownall, who lived eight years in the colonies, from 1753 to 1756, who held successively the offices of Lieutenant Governor of New Jersey, of Governor of Massachusetts, and of Governor of South Carolina, and who in those three capacities must be presumed to have been afforded every opportunity that could enable him well to appreciate in the people that surrounded him that peculiar forwardness and energy of purpose which have since realized so wonderfully what that great and wise man had contemplated in vision, through the telescope of his far-seeing mind. Sir, I feel assured that the Senate will thank me for trespassing yet a moment upon its patience, while I shall read some of his most striking revelations :

“North America has advanced, and is every day advancing, to growth of State, with a steady and continually accelerating motion, of which there has never yet been any example in Europe.” \* \* \* \* \*

“It is young and strong.” \* \* \* “Its strength will grow with its years, and it will establish its constitution and perfect adulthood in growth of State. To this greatness of empire it will certainly arise.” \* \* \* “America will become the arbitress of the commercial world, and perhaps the mediatrix of peace, and *of the political business of the world.*”

“Whoever knows these people will consider them as animated, in this new world, if I may so express it, *with the spirit of the new philosophy.*”

“Here one sees the inhabitants laboring after the plough, or with the spade and hoe, as though they had not an idea beyond the ground they dwell upon; yet is their mind all the while enlarging all its powers, and their spirit rises as their improvements advance.”

“The independence of America is fixed as fate. She is mistress of her own fortune; knows that she is so, and will actuate that power which she feels, both so as to establish her own system *and to change the system of Europe.*”

“Those sovereigns of Europe who have been led by the office system and worldly wisdom of their ministers—who, seeing things in those lights, have despised the unfashioned, awkward youth of America—when they shall find the system of this new empire *not only obstructing but superceding the old systems of Europe,* and crossing upon the effects of all their settled maxims and accustomed measures, they will call upon these their ministers and wise men, ‘*Come, curse me this people, for they are too mighty for me;*’ their statesmen will be dumb; but the spirit of truth will answer, ‘*How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed?*’”

“America will come to market in its own shipping, and will claim the ocean as common—will claim a navigation restrained by no laws but the law of nations, reformed as the rising crisis requires.”

“America will seem every day to approach nearer and nearer to Europe. When the alarm which the idea of going to a strange and distant county gives to the homely notions of a European manufacturer or peasant shall be thus worn out, a thousand repeated repulsive feelings respecting their present home, a thousand attractive motives respecting the settle-

ment which they will look to in America, will raise a spirit of adventure, and become the irresistible cause of an almost *general emigration to that new world.*"

"Whether the islands in those parts called the West Indies are naturally parts of this North American communion, is a question, in the detail of it, of curious speculation, but of no doubt as to the fact."

Then, giving way to the enthusiasm of his prophetic spirit, he addresses himself in direct language to America:

"A nation to whom all nations will come; a power whom all powers of Europe will court to civil and commercial alliances; a people to whom the remnants of all ruined people will fly; whom the oppressed and injured of every nation will seek for refuge," he exclaims, "ACTUATE YOUR SOVEREIGNTY, EXERCISE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF YOUR THRONE."

Arise! ascend thy lofty seat,

Be clothed with thy strength—

Lift up on high a standard to the nations!!!

Mr. CASS. He was an old foggy after my own heart.

Mr. SOULE. And I rejoice that yours is a heart as stout and comprehensive as his.

Sir, public opinion has already responded to that mighty appeal from the past. It scorns the presumptuous thought, that you can restrain this now grown country within the narrow sphere of action assigned to its nascent energies, and keep it eternally bound up in swaddles. As the infant grows, it will require more substantial nourishment; more active exercise. The lusty appetites of its manhood would ill fare with what might satisfy the sober demands of a younger age. Attempt not, therefore, to stop it in its onward career, attempt it not; for as well might you command the sun not to break through the fleecy clouds that herald its advent on the horizon, or to shroud itself in gloom and darkness as it ascends the meridian.



## APPENDIX.

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The following original letter from General Washington to Mr. Madison, was introduced by Mr. Soule in the course of his speech, in illustration of one of the points he made, to the effect that the policy attributed to Washington was not among the suggestions which he submitted to Mr. Madison when he requested him to prepare a form for his Farewell Address.

MOUNT VERNON, *May 20, 1792.*

MY DEAR SIR: AS there is a possibility, if not a probability, that I shall not see you on your return home; or, if I should see you, it may be on the road and under circumstances which will prevent my speaking to you on the subject we last conversed upon, I take the liberty of committing to paper the following thoughts and requests: I have not been unmindful of the sentiments expressed by you in the conversation just alluded to. On the contrary, I have again and again revolved them, with thoughtful anxiety, but without being able to dispose my mind to a longer continuance in the office I have yet the honor to hold. I therefore still look forward to the fulfillment of my fondest and most ardent wishes, to spend the remainder of my days (which I cannot expect will be many) in ease and tranquillity. Nothing short of conviction that my dereliction of the Chair of Government (if it should be the desire of the people to continue me in it) would involve the country in serious disputes respecting the Chief Magistrate, and the disagreeable consequences which might result therefrom, in the floating and divided opinions which so prevail at present, could in no wise induce me to relinquish the determination I have formed; and of this I do not see how any evidence can be obtained previous to the election. My vanity, I am sure, is not of that cast, as to allow me to view the subject in this light. Under these impressions then, permit me to reiterate the request I made to you at our last meeting, namely: To think of the proper time and the best mode of announc-

ing the intention, and that you would prepare the latter. In revolving this subject myself my judgment has always been embarrassed. On the one hand, a previous declaration to retire, not only carries with it the appearance of vanity and self-importance ; but it may be construed into a manœuvre to be invited to remain. And on the other hand, to say nothing implies consent, or at any rate would leave the matter in doubt ; and to decline afterwards might be deemed as bad and uncandid. I would fain carry my request to you farther than is asked above. Although I am sensible that your compliance with it must add to your trouble ; but as the recess may afford you leisure, and I flatter myself you have disposition to oblige me, I will, without apology, desire (if the measure in itself should strike you as proper and likely to produce public good or private honor) that you would turn your thoughts to a valedictory address for me to the public, expressing in plain and modest terms, that having been honored with the presidential chair, and to the best of my abilities, contributed to the organization and administration of the government : that having arrived at a period of life when the private walks of it, in the shade of retirement, becomes necessary and will be most pleasant to me, and the spirit of the Government may render a rotation in the elective officers of it, more congenial with their ideas of liberty and safety ; that I take my leave of them as a public man, and in bidding them adieu, (retaining no other concern than such as will arise from fervent wishes for the prosperity of my country.) I take the liberty at my departure from civil, as I formerly did at my military exit, to invoke a continuance of the blessings of Providence upon it, and upon all those who are the supporters of its interests, and the promoters of harmony, order, and good government.

That to impress these things, it might among other things be observed, that we are *all* the children of the same country—a country great and rich in itself—capable, and promising to be as happy as any the annals of history have ever brought to our view. That our interests, however diversified in local and smaller matters, is the same in all the great and essential concerns of the nation. That the contrast of our country, the diversity of our climate and soil, and the various productions



of the States, consequent of both, are such as to make one part not only convenient, but perhaps indispensably necessary to the other part, and may render the whole (at no distant period) one of the most independent in the world. That the established government being the work of our own hands, with the seeds of amendment engrafted in the Constitution, may, by wisdom, good dispositions and mutual allowances, aided by experience, bring it as near to perfection as any human institution ever approximated; and, therefore, the only strife among us ought to be: who should be foremost in facilitating and finally accomplishing such great desirable objects, by giving every possible support and cement to the Union. That however necessary it may be to keep a watchful eye over public servants and public measures, yet there ought to be limits to it; for suspicions unfounded, and jealousies too lively, are irritating to honest feelings, and oftentimes are productive of more evil than good.

To enumerate the various subjects which might be introduced into such an Address would require thought, and to mention them to you would be unnecessary, as your own judgment will comprehend *all* that will be proper. Whether to touch specially any of the exceptionable parts of the Constitution may be doubted; all I shall add therefore at present, is to beg the favor of you to consider—

1st. The propriety of such an Address;

2d. If approved, the several matters which ought to be contained in it; and

3d. The time it should appear—that is, whether at the declaration of my intention to withdraw from the service of the public, or to let it be the closing act of my administration, which will end with the next session of Congress, (the probability being that that body will continue setting until March,) when the House of Representatives will also dissolve.

Though I do not wish to hurry you (the cases not pressing) in the execution of either of the publications before mentioned, yet I should be glad to hear from you, generally, on both, and to receive them in time, if you should not come to

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Philadelphia until the session commences, in the form they are to take.

I beg leave to draw your attention also to such things as you shall conceive fit subjects for communication on that occasion, and noting them as they occur, that you would be so good as to furnish me with them in time to be prepared, and be engrafted with others for the opening of the session.

With very sincere and affectionate regard, I am ever yours,  
G. WASHINGTON.

JAMES MADISON, Jr., Esq.







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